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In many states in Sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic groups organize their political decision-making, 
their conflict resolution, or land rights via traditional political institutions (TPI). TPI co-exist 
with the institutions of the state. This type of co-existence is not limited to Sub-Saharan Africa 
but can be found across the globe (Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey, 2016, 470), with an estimated 
57 percent of the world population living in countries where customary and other forms of law 
exist in parallel (JuriGlobe 2019). Moreover, TPI are also an important factor shaping various 
political issues and outcomes, ranging from the provision of public goods (Baldwin 2015, 2019; 
Goist and Kern 2019), economic development (Acemoglu, Reed and Robinson, 2014), democ-
racy and elections (Baldwin 2013, 2014, 2019; Baldwin and Holzinger 2019; Baldwin and 
Mvukiyehe 2015; de Kadt and Larreguy 2018; Koter 2013), or peace and conflict (Wig and 
Kromrey 2017; Mustasilta 2019). The interaction of TPI and the state plays a crucial part in 
these outcomes, especially where their agendas collide. 
While the existence of TPI is a worldwide phenomenon, for Sub-Saharan Africa in par-
ticular, several scholars have identified a “resurgence” of TPI in recent years (e.g. Englebert 
2002a; Erk 2014; Logan 2009; Ubink 2008). The Afrobarometer surveys reveal that constitu-
ents continue to consider TPI important and express a desire for a greater political role of tra-
ditional leaders (Logan 2013). Authors also find that TPI become increasingly codified in con-
stitutions, implying recognition by the state (Holzinger et al. 2019). Yet, evidence for the con-
stitutional resurgence of TPI is mostly based on case analysis. The scope and the conditions for 
the alleged resurgence remain unclear.  
In this paper, we therefore analyse the constitutional integration of TPI and their resurgence 
comparatively across all Sub-Saharan countries to systematically examine the conditions lead-
ing to the current constitutional regulation of TPI. We define constitutional integration as the 
degree of codified recognition of TPI in a country's constitutional documents, and constitutional 
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resurgence as the increasing degree of constitutional integration of TPI. We code the most re-
cent and the Sub-Saharan constitutions in 1990 with respect to their provisions on TPI. Our data 
confirm the resurgence of TPI on a constitutional level. Using a fuzzy-set Qualitative Compar-
ative Analysis (fsQCA) we find that, particularly in former British colonies, traditional leaders 
were able to translate the arrangements of indirect rule as well as the political advantages of a 
country’s deconcentrated settlement patterns into greater constitutional status. Moreover, the 
latter element has remained important for traditional leaders to increase constitutional status – 
implying a constitutional resurgence of TPI. 
2. THE RESURGENCE OF TPI IN CONTEMPORARY SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
2.1 Literature on resurgence of TPI 
The coexistence of state and TPI in Sub-Saharan Africa’s political arenas has long been recog-
nized (e.g. Mamdani 1996; Buur and Kyed 2007; Megisteab and Hagg 2017). While numerous 
studies have investigated traditional governance and its role (Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey 
2016 provide a comprehensive overview), we briefly hint at some recent examples: Scholars of 
legal pluralism in Africa have described the different ways states incorporate customary law in 
their legal frameworks (e.g. Ubink 2008; Muriaas 2009). For Zambia and Sub-Saharan Africa 
in general, Baldwin shows the contemporary roles of TPI, e.g. in public goods provision and 
electoral outcomes (2013, 2015, 2019). Hariri’s (2012) focuses on how strong, proto-state pre-
colonial institutions have led to an autocratic legacy in many non-European countries. For a 
sample of 33 former British colonies, Lange (2004) finds that indirect rule via customary au-
thorities has a strongly negative effect on measures such as bureaucratic effectiveness, political 
stability or the rule of law. Looking at electoral politics in South Africa, de Kadt and Larreguy 
(2018) show how chiefs’ alignment with the incumbent party (African National Congress) im-
proves the latter’s electoral performance. Finally, for communities in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, van der Windt et al. (2019) find that citizens’ support for TPI and the state can go 
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hand in hand in a complementary fashion: where support for the state increases, so does support 
of TPI.  
Yet, none of these studies comprehensively explains the varying constitutional status of TPI 
in Sub-Saharan Africa or attempts to analyse the observed resurgence of TPI in comparative 
perspective. A number of scholars have identified a “resurgence” of traditional authority start-
ing in the 1990s. Sklar (1999) reviews the role of TPI in the constitutions and politics of a small 
number of African countries. He concludes that many African polities are characterized by 
mixed government, i.e. cooperative interaction among distinct and relatively autonomous gov-
ernmental institutions involving the state and TPI. According to Sklar, the institutionalization 
of mixed government has somewhat increased in the 1990s. Englebert (2002a) points to the 
variance of resurgence across the continent – manifest e.g. in legal-institutional arrangements 
such as national houses of chiefs in Ghana, Botswana, South Africa and Namibia. Yet, when 
examining which factors determine the variance in the resurgence, he asserts that no clear pic-
ture emerges.  
Explicit references to a resurgence of traditional authority can also be found in Boone’s study 
on land tenure reforms in Africa and the involvement of neo-traditional institutions (2007), 
Erk’s mapping of the resurgence of TPI as one of five evolutionary patterns in African decen-
tralization (2014), as well as in Ubink’s work on the general resurgence of TPI in Africa (2008). 
In her argumentation, “resurgence” appears to be two-fold: first, a comeback of a stronger legal 
recognition of traditional authority by African national governments; and second, an increased 
interest of the academic community to study the dynamics of traditional leadership within the 
modern nation-state. In a similar fashion, Nabudere (2004) maintains that because of the dys-
functional nation-state in Sub-Saharan Africa, TPI have “resurged” across the region.  
Englebert (2002b) looks at the “born-again” Buganda Kingdom in Uganda. The latter has re-
emerged in the 1990s with increased social significance and granted legal roles in the constitu-
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tion. For South Africa, Oomen and van Kessel (1997) depict the “constitutionalization” of tra-
ditional authority, and Koelble and LiPuma (2011) find traditional leaders to have resurged as 
intermediaries between the state and society. Yet, Beall et al. (2005) do not see resurgence, but 
rather persistence of TPI in South Africa. Finally, Baldwin (2014) finds that traditional chiefs 
in Zambia have seen their responsibility in land administration increase and argues that this is 
because political leaders cede control of land resources to traditional leaders of non-co-ethnic 
groups in exchange for mobilising electoral support in such communities.  
2.2 Namibia as a paradigmatic case of resurgence 
Namibia serves as an example for a resurgence of TPI. Today, TPI in Namibia are strongly 
integrated into state structures on the constitutional and legal level. The Namibian constitution 
of 1990 acknowledges TPI in regard to two aspects: First, article 66(1) recognizes customary 
law as one of Namibia’s sources of law. Traditional authorities, who feature in customary law, 
are thus implicitly acknowledged by the constitution. Second, article 102(5) presupposes the 
existence of traditional authorities, as it allows for the establishment of a Council of Traditional 
Leaders that advises the president on all matters of interest to traditional authorities (Hinz 2008, 
66). Beyond constitutional recognition, there are a number of laws and statutes which regulate 
the relationship of traditional and state institutions.1 One of the key pieces of legislation is the 
2000 Traditional Authority Act which provides for the formal establishment of traditional au-
thorities and outlines their responsibilities, functions, and duties. According to the Act, chiefs 
have to be installed by their traditional community and have to be officially recognized by the 
state. Until now, around 50 traditional authorities have been recognized and are given a finan-
cial allowance by the state (Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey 2017). 
 
1 Local Authorities Act 1992; Regional Authorities Act 1992; Council of Traditional Leaders Act 
1997; Traditional Authority Act 2000 replacing the former Traditional Authority Act of 1995; 
Community Courts Act, 2003. 
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The current high degree of constitutional integration of TPI has its roots in colonial rule. 
During German colonial rule (since 1884) and the following South African Apartheid regime 
(since 1949), traditional leaders were used as local governing agents in a system of indirect rule 
in the North, whereas in the South a more direct rule was implemented by the Germans. Pre-
colonially, the northern Kingdoms, such as Ovambo, Kaoko, or Kavango, were in possession 
of land with their kings taking decisions on the allocation of agricultural land among commu-
nity members. The southern headmenships, like the Damara, Nama or San, with their nomadic 
life-style, did not own territory. During colonialism these differences were fortified with the 
erection of the veterinary cordon fence (for a detailed historical account cf. Lechler and 
McNamee 2018). Still today, the northern traditional institutions are stronger and more hierar-
chically organized (cf. Hinz 2008). Lechler and McNamee show that this even affects attitudes 
towards democracy today, with people north of the fence being less supportive of democracy.  
After independence from South Africa, a process of “re-appropriation of tradition” (Hinz 
2008, 68) started in 1990. A presidential commission of enquiry was set up in 1991, with the 
task to provide information about the de facto roles and functions of traditional authorities and 
their acceptance by the people. The commission concluded “that the traditional system is not 
only necessary but also viable” and “recommends that it be retained within the context of the 
provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Nambia” (cited in Hinz 2008, 70). In 1992, a 
national meeting of politicians, legal experts and traditional leaders initiated the process of or-
dinary law development.  
The subsequent Traditional Authority Act (2000) stipulated regulations for all Namibian TPI 
based on the hierarchical model of the northern kingdoms which led to a convergence of tradi-
tional authority structures in the country (Holzinger, Kern and Kromrey 2017). This might be 
explained by the stronger presence of the northern kingdoms in the processes of law develop-
ment. The governing SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organisation) had its origins as 
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liberation movement “Ovamboland People’s Organisation” and thus drew on stronger links 
with the northern Ovambo kings (Düsing 2002: 123ff.; Welz und Kromrey 2015).  
It is important to note that only those TPI with traditional land could be recognized, transfer-
ring the existence of communal land into a basis of traditional power (Behr, Haer and Kromrey 
2015). Consequently, demands for land rights and claims for kingships emerged during the 
early 1990s (Düsing 2002: 128ff.). This way TPIs became more relevant in the rural areas of 
Namibia, in particular the northern kingdoms, but also in the south. During the 1990s Namibia 
was highly deconcentrated, with a number of smaller regional centers. Almost 70 percent of the 
Namibian population resided in rural areas. Local government structures were weak, however, 
as the newly democratic state still struggled to build up local state capacity. Therefore, as Düs-
ing states: “[t]he impact of traditional leadership, as quasi local government bodies and agencies 
of rural development in these areas, cannot be underestimated” (2002, 241) and “they still re-
main the only local level institution to fill the gap left by a largely absent state” (2002, 243). 
Land allocation and rural development are seen as the most important function of TPI and tra-
ditional leaders are still widely accepted in rural communities and often more so than regional 
councilors (Keulder 1997; Düsing 2002: 243ff.). This led to parallel political structures in rural 
areas.  
In sum, the following factors seem to have contributed to the constitutional and legal resur-
gence of TPI in Namibia: A colonial system of indirect rule allowed for TPI to uphold a strong 
political role. After independence, TPI could maintain this role, in particular in the highly pop-
ulated rural areas because of the weakness of the state at regional and local level. Finally, in the 
newly developing democracy they were able to effectively exert demand for legal recognition.  
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3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Scholars employ at least three distinct conceptions of the resurgence of TPI. First, resurgence 
can be understood as an increase of the perceived social-political importance that African con-
stituents ascribe to traditional leaders. The Afrobarometer provides comparative data for 19 
countries in round 4 (2008), and for 33 countries in round 6 (2014-15). For the countries in-
cluded in both rounds, “trust in traditional leaders” has increased by 5 percent on average be-
tween 2008 and 2015. Second, resurgence might be understood as the increase of actual politi-
cal influence of traditional leaders in a country. This type of resurgence is more difficult to 
uncover and is mostly observed in case studies. Third, resurgence can be understood as the 
increasing degree of constitutional integration of TPI (see Sklar 1999). 
We focus on the latter definition. To be sure, constitutional arrangements and their changes 
are not by themselves a direct measure of the varying power of TPI. At times, constitutions can 
appear as mere written rules that only partially reflect political realities. Constitutions may e.g. 
include progressive rules on issues such as gender equality even if in practice societies adhere 
to opposing norms. Aware of these limitations, we however argue that measuring the social 
influence of TPI by focusing on variance in their constitutionalization is a valid empirical strat-
egy for at least three reasons:  
First, and more generally, constitutions are ubiquitous and can be found in all countries across 
Sub-Saharan Africa. This allows us to include a larger sample of countries in our sample as 
compared to relying e.g. on survey data from the Afrobarometer, which does not include as 
many countries.2 
 
2 Round 4 of the Afrobarometer includes public opinion data for only 19 countries of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, compared to 45 countries in our sample. Moreover, round 4 of the Afrobarometer is the 
first with a battery on attitudes about traditional leader and was collected for 2008/2009. There is 
unfortunately no comprehensive public opinion data prior or close to our baseline data for 1990, 
and thus we cannot infer whether there has been a change in public opinion over time in support 
for TPI leading to a change in constitutional law. That said, our additional analyses (not included 
here and only for the 19 countries surveyed in round 4) showed positive correlations between our 
measure of contemporary constitutional integration and items measuring public support for TPI. 
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Second, changing a constitution always involves high institutional hurdles. As similarly ar-
gued by Elgie (2012) or Tsebelis and Nardi (2014), a changed constitution “had serious short-
comings and […] overwhelming majorities understood and suffered from these shortcomings” 
(Tsbelis and Nardi 2014, 11). Successful changes in the constitution therefore reflect a previous 
mismatch between the constitutional document and social realities on the ground – either in the 
eyes of the constitution-makers or the constituency as a whole. A change in the constitution 
seeks to amend this mismatch e.g. by increasing the constitutional powers of TPI, or by curtail-
ing the rights of TPI compared to the previous constitution.  
Third, a change in the constitution may also represent an increased awareness of an issue that 
constitution-makers need to incorporate as a signal to a relevant audience. Thus, even if in 
reality changes are slow to manifest, the recognition of the importance of such rights and 
acknowledgements can serve as a future reference point to the affected population. To be sure, 
the motivations for constitutional changes we observe may vary: a government may want to 
accommodate TPI by granting increased rights to them or strive for more control over tradi-
tional leadership by further defining their role constitutionally or by excluding TPI from any 
constitutional rights. Legally integrated TPI may even lose power compared to a situation of 
informal coexistence with the state – a case in point is Uganda, where the constitutionalization 
of traditional leaders in 1995 implied taking away their right to participate in partisan politics. 
At the very least, a change in the constitutional integration of TPI (a resurgence or a dismantling 
of rights) is an important signal by the constitution-makers that the issue of TPI and their role 
in the political sphere cannot be ignored.  
Englebert (2002a) puts forward four possible explanations of traditional resurgence: “state 
strength”, or the capacity of state institutions; democratization on the country-level; the domes-
tic economic situation; and “external and facilitating material factors”. The latter include very 
 
However, given the limited sample, we only take this as pointing to a possible link between public 
opinion and constitutional law rather than evidence of causation.  
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different factors such as pressures from the development community, or ratification of interna-
tional treaties. Englebert discusses evidence for correlations but does not present empirical 
tests, and in fact is cautious in his interpretation of causal relationships and directions of effects. 
In our study, we include the “theoretical speculations” Englebert suggests (2002a, 55) and add 
two further factors that we deem particularly important: colonial legacies and settlement pat-
terns.   
Analysing constitutional “resurgence” implies comparison across time. Because authors ar-
gue that TPI have been increasingly constitutionalized since the 1990s, we compare two points 
in time in order to track the change (the constitutional text in 1990 and the most recent consti-
tution, with 2012 as the cut-off point for our coding). We look at two different outcomes: the 
current constitutional status of TPI and its change since 1990. Explaining both status and 
change of the constitutional integration of TPI requires the distinction of causes that may have 
status-related and change-related effects. In the following, we discuss the explanatory factors 
and present separate hypotheses on one or both of our outcomes. Status-related hypotheses are 
subscripted with a t, while change-related hypotheses are subscripted with a Δt.  
3.1 Legacies of colonial rule and administration 
The effect of past colonial administration on constitutional arrangements only shapes the status 
of constitutional integration of TPI, as the variable does not change after independence or 
1990.3 During colonization in Africa, two approaches can be distinguished: first, direct rule, 
usually associated with French authorities; and second, indirect rule, commonly associated with 
British authorities. In the French system, traditional structures were preferably abolished or 
assimilated, while the British would attempt to include traditional systems within their hierar-
chies of rule (Young 1994, 149ff.) and often granted them a legal status by decrees or similar 
 
3  While in some countries colonial power changed before independence, for the time-period of 
interest (1990 until today), colonial legacy is fixed. 
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documents. We thus expect that former British colonies are more likely to include TPI in their 
constitutions after independence (cf. Englebert 2002a, 56). While colonial approaches may 
have varied depending on local contexts (Boone 1998, 15-16), one can assume that path de-
pendencies of these policies have left their mark in later constitutional texts. If chiefs had a 
strong administrative role during colonial rule, they might have been able to leverage an equally 
strong formalized role after independence.4 As British and French were not the only colonial 
powers in Sub-Saharan Africa, we simplify by discerning British and non-British colonies. This 
leads to the following hypothesis:   
H1t: British colonial rule before independence leads to a high level of constitutional 
integration of TPI. 
3.2 Deconcentrated settlement patterns  
TPI can be assumed to be more significant in rural territories because remoteness and ethnic 
homogeneity of communities should allow TPI to retain a strong role in the lives of constituents. 
The dynamics should be similar in smaller but ethnically homogenous cities that form regional 
sub-centres, where personal contact with TPI and community members is frequent. In contrast, 
in large metropolized areas, the heterogeneous ethnic environment together with the impact of 
modern individualistic life-style will weaken individuals’ social ties to their place of origin and 
the TPI there. Thus, deconcentrated settlement patterns can be indicative of societal moderni-
zation. Deconcentrated settlement patterns in a country, i.e. a relatively small population living 
in very large urban centres (metropolises) as compared to those living in a higher number of 
small cities, should affect social significance of TPI and political demand for constitutionaliza-
tion. Thus, the more concentrated the population is in metropolitan areas, the less significant 
should be TPI, and the less constitutional integration we expect to observe.  Consequently, an 
 
4  Equally, one might presume that chiefs who were collaborators under colonial rule were not in-
cluded in post-colonial constitutional arrangements.  
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increase in metropolization should lead to decreased socio-political significance of traditional 
leaders, and a weaker constitutional role of TPI. 
H2t: A deconcentrated settlement pattern (i.e. low metropolization) leads to a high 
level of constitutional integration of TPI. 
H2Δt: A concentration in settlement patterns (i.e. an increase in metropolization) leads 
to a decrease in the level of constitutional integration of TPI. 
3.3 Level of democracy and democratization 
A democratic state ideally accommodates heterogeneous interests of its constituents, e.g. by 
granting cultural rights to ethnic groups or minorities. A democracy should thus be more prone 
to respond to demands for constitutional status of such special group rights. Thus, we expect a 
more democratic state to display a higher status of constitutional integration of TPI. The level 
of democratic performance of a state might change over time. A state may democratize, or its 
political institutions may become more autocratic, possibly leading to a change of the constitu-
tional integration of TPI over time. Thus, we expect a democratizing state to exhibit an increase 
of the constitutional integration of TPI (cf. Englebert 2002a, 58). The following two hypotheses 
describe both causal mechanisms:  
H3t: A high level of democracy leads to a high level of constitutional integration of 
TPI. 
H3Δt: Democratization leads to an increase in the level of constitutional integration of 
TPI. 
3.4 State capacity 
Another argument presumes TPI are particularly strong in states where governments are weak 
(cf. Englebert 2002a, 56). The mechanism relating weak state capacity and the constitutional 
integration of TPI may run in two directions. First, the constitutional integration of TPI may 
  
14 
enable governments to administer remote areas of the territory through them. Second, the con-
stitutional inclusion of TPI might be a way to appease constituents in those regions. Thus, a 
country with low state capacity might display greater levels of constitutional integration of TPI. 
Again, state capacity may be subject to change over time. If state capacity increases, the con-
stitutional integration of TPI might decrease. The subsequent hypotheses reflect this argumen-
tation:  
H4t: Low state capacity leads to a high level of constitutional integration of TPI. 
H4Δt: A decrease in state capacity leads to an increase in the level of constitutional 
integration of TPI. 
3.5 Economic development 
The level of economic development of a country may shape how states include TPI in their 
constitutions. Poor economic opportunities for constituents may go hand-in-hand with more 
informal subsistence-based economies. The latter are more likely to provide a greater role to 
traditional leaders as arbiters in these markets, e.g. in terms of granting access to land via tra-
ditional tenure rules, or traditional control over natural resource access and use. The increased 
leverage of TPI in informal economic transactions translates into constitutional integration in 
case governments acknowledge that local economic prosperity depends on traditional rules and 
actors. Thus, in countries with low levels of economic opportunity, one might expect constitu-
tional integration of TPI. Further, economic performance may change over time, and countries 
may see an amelioration or deterioration of economic development and opportunities.  
H5t: A low level of economic development leads to a high level of constitutional inte-
gration of TPI. 
H5Δt: A decrease in the level of economic development leads to an increase in the level 
of constitutional integration of TPI.  
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3.6 External factors: Foreign Aid 
Finally, Englebert (2002a) discusses external and facilitating material factors. We suggest that 
the tying of foreign aid to constitutional reform by international financial institutions during the 
1990s and beyond (as a consequence of the so-called Washington Consensus) could have stim-
ulated the constitutionalization of many factors, among them TPI. Change in official develop-
ment assistance (ODA) could therefore also lead to the constitutional integration of TPI by 
conditionality, e.g. by demands for greater deconcentration of power or more participatory pol-
itics.  
H6Δt: An increase in the level of official development assistance leads to an increase 
in the level of constitutional integration of TPI.  
4. METHOD AND DATA 
We do not assume the six potential explanations as individually sufficient to cause constitu-
tional integration or resurgence. Rather, the causal factors complement each other and work in 
conjuncture. We assume that combinations of several conditions may explain the outcome, and 
furthermore, that different combinations might have the same effect on the constitutional status 
of TPI or a change of it. This leads us to employ Qualitative Comparative Analysis.  
4.1 Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) 
QCA uses a conception of causality that captures more than one causal pathway to an observed 
outcome and examines different combinations of causal conditions (Rihoux and Ragin 2009, 
8–10). In QCA, necessary and sufficient causal conditions are distinguished. A causal condition 
is necessary for the outcome if the condition is present in all instances the outcome is observed. 
A causal condition is sufficient for the outcome if the outcome is present in all instances the 
causal condition is observed (Ragin 2000, 100). Taken strictly, this conception implies that 
finding single cases that do not fit the causal pathway should lead us to reject our hypothesis. 
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However, as deterministic relationships are rare in the social sciences, Ragin proposes using 
benchmarks for “coverage” and for “consistency” to assess the hypotheses and explanatory 
power of different “solutions”. The solution formula describes the combination of conditions 
that lead to a given outcome. Coverage is the percentage of cases displaying the outcomes that 
are explained by a given solution formula (Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 119-150). Con-
sistency, in turn, is the percentage of cases that are described by (are consistent with) the solu-
tion formula.  
We choose fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) as the method of inference 
for three reasons. First, QCA allows for equifinality, that is, several causal paths can lead to the 
outcomes, the integration and resurgence of TPI. Second, as pointed out above, we expect com-
binations of several causal conditions to be particularly relevant – a methodological strength of 
QCA. Third, because our outcome is coded in four different categories along the dimension of 
how “integrative” the provisions in the constitutions are, i.e. how much TPI are integrated with 
the state political institutions, we use fuzzy-set QCA instead of crisp-set QCA.5 Moreover, pair-
wise correlations, cross-tabulations, and regression analysis have inferential limitations given 
our low number of observations – we analyse traditional resurgence in 45 Sub-Saharan African 
countries. Having outlined the reasons for choosing fsQCA to analyse the constitutional resur-
gence in Sub-Saharan Africa, we acknowledge the extensive methodological debate on the uses 
of QCA (e.g. Baumgartner and Thiem, 2015; Braumoeller 2017; Krogslund, Choi, and Poert-
ner, 2015; Lucas and Szatrowski 2014; Munck 2016, Paine 2016; Ragin 2014; Ragin and Ri-
houx 2004; Rohlfing 2015; Schneider and Rohlfing 2016; Thiem 2014, 2017).6  Thus, we pre-
sent additional statistical evidence to substantiate our findings. 
 
5  We employed the widely used fs/QCA (Ragin, Drass and Davey 2006), as well as QCA pro 
(Thiem 2016), and SetMethods (Medzihorsky, Oana, Quaranta and Schneider 2016), to avoid 
false algorithmic routines that might distort our results. 
6  See the debate within the American Political Science Association’s Qualitative & Multi-Method 
Research group, e.g. Newsletter (2014) vol. 12, no. 1 and no. 2. 
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We do not expect to find necessary conditions for constitutional integration and resurgence, 
even if some authors find such relationships in the social sciences (Schneider and Wagemann 
2007, 41, 60). We cannot imagine that the presence of integration or resurgence of TPI neces-
sarily requires the presence of a British colonizer, a democracy, low state capacity or low levels 
of development. The only necessary condition might be the mere existence of TPI in a country 
– a condition we cannot test because there is no variation in our sample. We thus assume our 
potential explanations to be sufficient conditions, which jointly, not individually, bring about 
the outcomes.  
4.2 Operationalization, data sources, and calibration 
We compare the constitutional integration at two points in time: (1) the status quo in 1990, and 
(2) in the year of the most current constitution (2012). The outcome of current constitutional 
integration is the formal regulation of TPI in the most recent constitution of a country. For 
constitutional resurgence, we measure constitutional change that occurred between 1990 and 
the current constitution. For both points in time, we coded the constitutions of 45 Sub-Saharan 
countries. However, we have to drop Liberia and Somalia from the analysis, since no adequate 
data on the conditions could be obtained.   
The application of fsQCA requires the calibration of the outcomes (integration, resurgence) 
and the causal conditions (colonial rule, deconcentrated settlement patterns, democratization, 
state capacity, economic development, official development assistance). That is, the variables 
need to be operationalized and mathematically transformed to an ordinal or continuous scale 
ranging between zero and one.  
We coded both outcomes qualitatively from constitutional documents in force in 1990 and 
the most current constitution. The levels of integration can vary from the recognition of tradi-
tional values to the integration of traditional leaders in local or national state government struc-
tures. Thus, we distinguish four degrees of constitutional integration (see table 1). Recalling 
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our hypotheses, a “high level of integration” corresponds to “integration” and “dualism”, and a 
“low level of integration” corresponds to “tolerance” and “non-integration”.  
 
Table 1 here.  
 
The following examples illustrate the ordinal categorizations. Tanzania does not make any pro-
visions for the recognition of TPI (coded 0.0). Her most current constitution (1977, amended 
2000) explicitly proclaims the unity of all citizens: “A citizen of the United Republic shall not 
have a right, status or special position on the basis of his lineage, tradition or descent” (Article 
3). Constitutional non-integration of any traditional norms reflects Julius Nyerere’s idea of Af-
rican socialism, aiming at abolishing ethnic divisions and unifying all Tanzanians (Geschiere, 
Meyer, and Pels 2008). The Gabon constitution (1991, amended in 2003) acknowledges tradi-
tional values and culture in its preamble: “Proclame solennellement son attachement à ses val-
eurs sociales profondes et traditionnelles, à son patrimoine culturel, matériel et spirituel, au 
respect des libertés, des droits et des devoirs du citoyen” (coded 0.3). The 2004 Mozambique 
constitution represents a case of dualism of traditional and state authorities (coded 0.7). It not 
only promotes traditional values, but also “recognize[s] and esteem[s] traditional authority that 
is legitimate according to the people and to customary law” (Article 118). However, in contrast 
to states in the highest category, no official status for traditional leaders is granted, nor an offi-
cial institutional setting established. In contrast, Ghana incorporates chieftaincies as political 
institutions in its 1992 constitution (amended 1996, Article 207) and even establishes a National 
House of Chiefs (Article 89) and is thus a highly integrative country (coded 1.0).  
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To check the robustness of our coding we refer to a new dataset that codes provisions on TPI 
and customary law for all UN member state constitutions valid in 2014.7 The data set provides 
simple counts of provisions and particular additive indices constructed from dichotomous cod-
ing. We test for the correlation of our outcome data and their most basic measures which capture 
our idea of the “extent of constitutional integration”. Their count variable correlates highly sig-
nificantly (p-value=0.01) at an R = 0.8141, and their basic index “acknowledgment” at an R = 
0.8330, which we take as a validation of robustness of our measurement.  
We measure resurgence as the change of the constitutional integration value between 1990 
and the most current constitution. This difference can take a negative value when we observe a 
dismantling of the legal status of TPI (e.g. from “dualism” to “non-integration”).  An illustrative 
example for a strong resurgence is Cameroon. The constitution of 1984 did not mention tradi-
tional rulers or customary law (coded 0, “non-integration”). However, the 1996 constitution 
(amended 2008) establishes a right for traditional rulers to be represented in the Regional Coun-
cils and to be elected by their peers (coded 1.0 as “integration”). Similarly, the 1962 constitution 
of Uganda (active in 1990) and its subsequent amendments do not include traditional leaders, 
while the constitution of 1995 includes a whole chapter on traditional and cultural leaders that 
specifies their rights and in particular excludes them from political office. Both cases would be 
considered a constitutional resurgence of TPI. 
We use the direct method of calibration in order to obtain fuzzy values for resurgence: fsQCA 
employs a logistic function to assign the fuzzy values from the raw data, given three qualitative 
anchors at 1 (full membership), 0.5 (point of indifference), and 0 (full non-membership) 
(Schneider and Wagemann 2012, 35-41). The direct method enables a fine-grained calibration 
without condensing the original data to categories and thus loses none of the original data’s 
 
7  We cannot compare this data to our 1990 coding, as it only captures the most recent date. The 
“TradGov Constitutional Data Set” was collected within the research project “Traditional Gov-




empirical information. We set the anchor points based on theoretical considerations, defining 
the highest positive change value as 1.0, the lowest value as 0.0, and no change as point of 
indifference, i.e. 0.5 on the fuzzy scale. 
For the explanations of resurgence, we use the conditions’ values of 1989 and of the year 
before the adoption of the current constitution, this way lagging the conditions and allowing for 
elapsed time for a causal effect. Since the time between the 1990 constitution and the adoption 
of the most current constitution varies considerably across the countries, we normalize this dif-
ference, arriving at a measure of the average yearly change in the conditions. The anchors for 
resurgence are based on the distribution of the empirical data for both the outcome and all 
conditions.  
We code the first condition, colonial rule, dichotomously. We distinguish between British 
and all other colonizers to capture the legacy of British indirect rule; before decolonization, a 
country was either under British rule (1.0) or under a non-British colonial power (0.0). We rely 
on the data of the “Quality of Government Institute”.8  
For the second condition, the deconcentrated settlement pattern, we use metropolization (cf. 
Schulz 2015 for the concept) and not urbanization as an indicator. First, what counts as “urban” 
in absolute numbers varies widely across Sub-Sahara Africa rendering an absolute measure of 
urbanization incomparable. Second, measures of urbanization typically include also popula-
tions living in smaller cities, i.e. in the regional sub-centres of a country. However, we assume, 
as outlined in the theory section, that TPI may be strong in smaller but ethnically homogenous 
 
8 See http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/data/datadownloads/qogstandarddata/. The QoG coding uses the 
last colonizer before independence; in cases with two colonizers for the contemporary territory 
of a state, the colonizer on the larger territory is used. Another measure of indirect rule is provided 
by Lange (2004), who codes the extent of indirect rule for 33 former British colonies (inside and 
outside Sub-Saharan Africa) by “dividing the number of colonially recognized customary court 
cases by the total number of court cases in 1955” (Lange 2004, 909). Our own analysis shows 
that our coding correlates highly and significantly with Lange’s measure, and using the latter in 
our QCA leads to analogous results. Using Lange’s measure yields slightly higher consistency 
values (0.87 compared to 0.83 with our measure) but with coverage losses (0.39 compared to 0.49 
in our measure).  
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cities that form regional sub-centres, where personal contact with TPI and community members 
is frequent. Therefore, we argue that a metropolization measure better proxies our idea of set-
tlement concentration.9 It is defined as the population in the largest city as a percentage of urban 
population and serves as an indicator of the degree to which we find not only one urban centre 
but also regional sub-centres in a country, i.e. a deconcentrated settlement pattern. We calibrate 
the fuzzy scale such that full membership (1.0) is achieved if 75 percent, no membership (0.0) 
if 25 percent, and cut-off (0.5) if 50 percent of the urban population live in the largest city. We 
rely on data provided by the World Bank.10 
For the calibration of all other conditions we again apply the direct method of calibration 
setting the anchor points theoretically. To operationalize the third condition, level of democ-
racy, we use data from POLITY IV, with scores ranging from 10 (full democracy) to -10 (full 
autocracy). We set the anchor points for the QCA calibration at 9 for democracies (1.0) and -9 
for non-democracies (0.0). For the point of indifference (0.5 on the fuzzy scale) we use the 
POLITY score of 0.5, this way interpreting all closed anocracies (0 to -5 POLITY score) as 
non-democratic.  
We operationalize the fourth condition, state capacity, using data and the scale for govern-
ment effectiveness provided by the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).11 For the direct 
calibration, we employ the original scale, ranging between -2 and 2, with zero as the point of 
indifference.  
We use GDP per capita to operationalize economic development (World Bank data). We 
calibrate as follows: full membership (1.0) is achieved with values of 4000 US Dollars and 
 
9  We ran the QCA model also with urbanization as a measure. It leads to similar results, although 
the coverage and consistency values are better for metropolization. Metropolization explains more 
cases, in particular for resurgence. See annex, tables A25-A27 for details. 
10 See http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx 
11  Data by the International Country Risk Guide data are only available for 30 out of the 45 Sub-




above, no membership (0.0) with values of 500 US Dollars and below, and the cut-off point 
(0.5) is set at a value of 1500 US Dollars.  
Finally, to operationalize foreign aid we use data from the OECD12 measuring the share of 
official development assistance in the respective countries’ Gross National Income (GNI). As 
we test hypothesis 6 only for resurgence, we do not use the direct calibration method for inte-
gration. We set the anchors for resurgence based on the empirical distribution of the data, just 
as for the other conditions (see above).  
5. ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
We first provide descriptive evidence of the constitutional integration and the resurgence of 
TPI. Subsequently, we analyse the necessary and sufficient conditions for the outcomes “inte-
gration” and “resurgence”.13  
5.1 Description of constitutional integration  
We start with an overview on the extent of the constitutional integration of TPI in the year 1990 
and the current constitutions. Table 2 demonstrates that almost 50 percent of countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa provided constitutional status for TPI in 1990. Today, the corresponding figure 
is close to 75 percent. Thus, we observe an increase of constitutional integration, overall con-
firming a constitutional resurgence across countries. We also find that the rise is particularly 
strong with respect to the acceptance of a “dualism” of state and TPI. Moreover, many states 
moved away from “non-integration” of traditional values, rights or authorities.  
 
 
12  See https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm 
13 While we follow Schneider and Wagemann (2010) to first analyze the necessary, then the suffi-
cient conditions, we do not interrelate the two steps as proposed by their Theory-Guided/En-
hanced Standard Analysis (T/ESA). That is, we do not bar remainders that are incompatible with 
the results of the first stage from being used as simplifying assumptions by the Quine–McCluskey 
algorithm. We agree with Baumgartner (2015) that only parsimonious solutions (including all 
both positive and contradiction minterms) generate methodologically correct solutions. 
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Table 2 here. 
 
Table 3 further illustrates the extent of the constitutional resurgence of TPI. We observe an 
increase in constitutional status in 16 countries, i.e. in more than one third of our sample: An-
gola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, Madagascar, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Togo and Uganda. In more than half of the 
countries nothing changed in the constitutions with respect to TPI. Finally, there were six coun-
tries, which reduced the rights of TPI: Central African Republic, the Comoros, Djibouti, Equa-
torial Guinea, Nigeria and Senegal.  
 
Table 3 here. 
 
These results validate observations by Englebert (2002a) and others: a resurgence of TPI has 
occurred on the constitutional level since the 1990s. One third of countries incorporated rules 
regarding TPI into their constitutions, or strengthened existing rules. The observation must be 
qualified, however, as twelve countries continue to have no constitutional regulation at all.  
5.2 Analysis of integration 
Necessary conditions. We turn now to the analysis of necessary conditions for constitutional 
integration (see tables A2.1 and A2.2 in the annex). Following Schneider and Wagemann 
(2010), we first analyse potential necessity for all conditions separately. Empirically, none of 
the conditions reaches the standard for a necessary condition of a consistency value of 0.90 or 
higher. This is true for both the presence and the absence of constitutional integration, in line 
with our expectations.  
Sufficient conditions. By analysing sufficient conditions, we test whether the presence or ab-
sence of a certain condition or a combination of conditions is sufficient to cause integration. 
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Table A1 in the annex contains the truth table showing all 32 logically possible combinations 
of the five causal conditions and their empirical occurrence. We observe empirical instances 
for only 11 combinations, i.e. there are 21 logical remainders lacking empirical cases. We do 
not make assumptions on whether logical remainders lead to the absence or presence of the 
outcome, because our theory is not strong enough to do so. In consequence, we include all 
logical remainders in the analysis and present the so-called parsimonious solutions (Baumgart-
ner 2015). Nevertheless, we also report the complex solution in the Supplemental Annex (Ta-
bles A3 and A4), which excludes all possible counterfactuals in the minimization process for 
the sake of transparency and completeness (Wagemann and Schneider 2012). 
 
Table 4 here. 
The parsimonious solution consists of only two conditions, British colonial rule and the absence 
of metropolization (Table 4). The other three conditions appear inconsistently only in the com-
plex solutions (Table A3 in the Supplemental Annex) – sometimes presence, and sometimes 
absence contributes to integration.14 The overall consistency of the parsimonious solution is 
satisfactory (0.82), but covers only 48 percent of states. 
Conditions that are part of both parsimonious and complex solutions (or that are uniformly 
present across various solutions) can be considered “core elements” indicating a “strong” rela-
tionship with the outcome (Rihoux and Marx 2013). We can thus conclude that British colonial 
rule and a deconcentrated settlement pattern (low metropolization) contribute to the explanation 
 
14  Running the analysis for the absence of the outcome, i.e. non-integration, supports this finding. 
See annex, table A4 and A5. For robustness, we also ran the analysis excluding the condition state 
capacity, which reduces the number of logical remainders. All solutions produce the same solu-




of constitutional integration of TPI. We cannot provide satisfactory evidence for effects of de-
mocracy, state capacity and economic development.15 The medium coverage indicates, how-
ever, that our explanation might be incomplete and missing other important factor(s). 
In order to substantiate our findings, we employ standard statistical techniques. The results 
of correlation analysis and an ordered logit regression based on the un-calibrated data are sim-
ilar to the findings of the QCA (Tables A13 and A14 in the Supplemental Annex). Metropoli-
zation correlates significantly, weakly and negatively (-0.44, p-value 0.01) and British rule cor-
relates significantly and positively (0.42, p-value 0.01) with integration. The ordered logit 
model likewise shows a negative, significant effect for metropolization and a positive, signifi-
cant effect for British rule on integration. However, explained variance is low (R2 = 0.30) and 
the interaction term of metropolization and British rule is not significant. Metropolization is 
still significantly negative in the interaction model, which could indicate deconcentrated settle-
ment patterns are the most important explanation for constitutional integration. 
A closer look at the countries covered reveals that Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Malawi, Na-
mibia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe are typical cases for the so-
lution path, i.e. they exhibit a low level of metropolization, are former British colonies, and 
have a high level of constitutional integration of TPI. Sudan, Uganda, Kenya and Nigeria dis-
play a lower level of integration but a similar causal direction. Thus, about half of all countries 
recognizing TPI (integration or dualism) were subject to British colonial rule and exhibit a high 
level of deconcentrated settlement pattern (low metropolization). The QCA reveals that it is the 
conjunction of both conditions that explains integration – separately, neither British colonial 
administration, nor low metropolization are necessary or sufficient for the constitutional inte-
gration of TPI. 
 
15  Since three conditions exhibit skewed distributions, we also carried out a crisp-set analysis as a 
robustness check. The results are overall similar and the values for consistency (0.85) and cover-
age (0.65) are even improved. See annex, tables A7 through A9 for details. 
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Based on this finding, we would expect former British colonies with deconcentrated settle-
ment patterns such as Mauritius and Tanzania to equally strongly integrate TPI. Yet, they show 
low values of constitutional integration. Reasons unaccounted for by our theory led these coun-
tries to constitutionally ignore TPI. Regarding Tanzania, the establishment of Ujamaa reforms 
and the corresponding side-lining of TPI might be reasons for the country’s deviance. Mauritius 
is a special case, because it was colonized by the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French and the 
British, and had no indigenous population before colonization. The current population consists 
predominantly of people from Indian and Creole origin (cf. Tinker 1977).   
Fifteen countries show neither the solution path nor the outcome and are thus consistent with 
the theory. Finally, twelve countries show the outcome but not the solution path and remain 
thus unexplained: Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, DRC, Ethiopia, Gambia, Madagas-
car, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda and Togo.  
5.3 Analysis of resurgence  
In the analysis of constitutional resurgence, we run two models. For the first model, we use 
three conditions: democratization, change in deconcentrated settlement patterns, and change in 
economic development. Colonial rule did not change after the year 1990. State capacity data is 
unavailable for 1990 (or 1989). For these conditions we are thus unable to calculate the change 
over time.16 For the second model, we add change in official development assistance as the 
forth condition. Our sample for both models consists of 42 countries of which 15 experienced 
a resurgence, six a constitutional dismantling, and half of the sample (21) remain unchanged 
with respect to TPI.17 Two of the variables exhibit skewed distributions: democratization and – 
 
16  Moreover, the exclusion of state capacity from the analysis of integration did not change the re-
sults (see annex, table A6). In addition, to control for alternative explanations we tested for inter-
nal conflict as a condition for resurgence. Conflict does not appear in any solution (see annex, 
tables A28-A30). 
17  We had to drop Benin because its 1990 constitution is also the most current one and we can thus 
not analyze change. 
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to some degree – resurgence. Consequently, we increase the consistency thresholds in the anal-
yses.  
Necessary conditions. We do not find any necessary conditions for resurgence.18 Closest to a 
single necessary condition is democratization. However, it is almost necessary for both the 
presence (0.875) and the absence (0.898) of the outcome. Moreover, in the compound analysis 
all conjunctions include democratization (see Tables A15.1 and A15.2 in the Supplemental An-
nex). We can interpret democratization as a background condition that is not causally related, 
as most countries in the sample experienced some democratization since 1990.  
Sufficient conditions. With three conditions (model 1), we have eight potential combinations 
to trigger resurgence. Two combinations have no empirical cases, i.e. there are two logical re-
mainders (see truth table A16 in the Supplemental Annex).  With four conditions (model 2), we 
have 16 potential combinations of which six are logical remainders (see truth table A31 in the 
Supplemental Annex)19. In both models, we make no assumptions about logical remainders. 
We display the parsimonious solution.  
The parsimonious solution of our first model shows that either a decrease in metropolization 
or an autocratization explain resurgence. However, causal paths including autocratization have 
very low unique coverage values. Only two countries in the sample experience autocratization 
(Eritrea and Gambia) and both exhibit no change (0.5) in the constitutional status of TPI. We 
can therefore neglect autocratization and focus on the core element of all solutions, the decrease 
in metropolization.20  
Table 5 here. 
 
 
18  This result stays robust after omission of the 21 countries which did not change the constitutional 
status of TPI. See Supplemental Annex, Tables A20 through A22 for details. 
19  The large share of logical remainders (6 out of 16) results from the skewed distribution of democ-
ratization, i.e. we hardly observe negative trends in democratization.  
20  Running the analysis for the absence of the outcome, i.e. constitutional dismantling/non-resur-
gence, again supports these findings. See Table A18 and A19 in the Supplemental Annex. 
  
28 
The latter appears consistently through all robustness checks. We first calculate a model ex-
cluding countries not experiencing a change of the constitutional status of their TPI, and second, 
calculate a crisp-set analysis in order to account for the skewedness of democratization (see 
annex, Tables A20 through A24 in the Supplemental Annex). The solutions in all robustness 
checks are similar to those above, without solution paths including autocratization, however. 
Table 6 here. 
 
For the second model, we find a similar result: either a decrease in metropolization in combi-
nation with an increase in development assistance, or autocratization explain resurgence (Table 
6). While this solution is more consistent, coverage is reduced compared to the model without 
aid (see Tables A31-A33 in the Supplemental Annex). That is, official development assistance 
seems to play a role in conjunction with metropolization: constitutionalization appears most in 
countries that decentralize and receive aid after 1990.  
In a final test, we exclude democratization as a condition and end up with the familiar path 
of a decrease in metropolization in all solutions (see Table A34 in the Supplemental Annex) for 
model 1, and the interaction of decreased metropolization and increased aid for model 2 (Table 
A35 in the Supplemental Annex). This leads us to conclude that the settlement structure has 
indeed greatest explanatory power.  
It seems that a decrease in metropolization – implying deconcentration of settlement patterns 
– prompts constitutional resurgence. In contrast, democratization is not causally linked to re-
surgence of TPI. Although coverage levels are much better compared to constitutional integra-
tion, the model for resurgence could still be improved in terms of explanatory power. This is 
confirmed by the statistical analysis (see Tables A36 and A37 in the Supplemental Annex). The 
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correlation of metropolization and resurgence is negative as expected, but weak and non-sig-
nificant. Likewise, the regression analysis exhibits a negative, but non-significant relationship 
of metropolization and resurgence.21  
Seven countries (Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda) 
are typical cases for the solution path, i.e. they experience an increase in deconcentrated settle-
ment together with strong constitutional resurgence, whereas Burundi and Gabon display only 
weak resurgence. The Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea do not show the out-
come although they meet the core solution. Finally, there are six unexplained cases: Burkina 
Faso, Cameroon, Niger, South Africa, Sudan and Togo exhibit resurgence but not the solution 
path. There must have been factors not connected to the settlement pattern that led these coun-
tries to constitutionalize TPI. Just as in the case of constitutional integration there is room for 
further explanatory conditions. For South Africa, for example, the end of the apartheid brought 
a new constitution including TPI in 1996.  
Our study attempts to provide an aggregate, comparative picture of integration and resur-
gence of TPI. While an in-depth qualitative investigation is beyond the scope of this paper, 
further unpacking some of the typical cases above helps illustrate the argument we make about 
the mechanisms at play linking a deconcentration of settlement patterns (or decreasing 
metropolization) to a constitutional resurgence of TPI. For instance, typical cases such as 
Mozambique or Uganda have experienced changes in the deconcentration of settlement patterns 
in the time period of our analysis (since 1990) through diffused urbanisation and population 
movements in each country. In practice, this meant that additional urban centres emerged be-
sides the largest city, equivalent to a decrease in metropolization captured in our models. The 
emergence of new urban centres was triggered by critical junctures in the trajectory of each 
state: In Uganda displacement of populations because of repeated episodes of violence within 
 
21  We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression because the outcome variable was transformed 
by the normalization to average yearly change from an ordinal to a discrete measure.  
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and in bordering countries has deconcentrated local settlement patterns and led to further urban 
agglomerations emerging. Moreover, towns such as Gulu in Uganda have been growing as “hu-
manitarian hotspots” given interventions of external actors (Büscher et al. 2018). For Mozam-
bique, which ended its civil war in 1992, Kirshner and Power (2015) describe in detail how the 
resource boom and related investment has led to further sub-boom towns emerging.  
According to our theory, the constitutional resurgence of TPI in both countries in the same 
time period reflects the emergence of these new urban power centres and changes in settlement 
patters. While urbanised, these new centres are smaller in size and possibly remain ethnically 
more homogenous, providing traditional leaders with the leverage to become local power bro-
kers, which may translate into greater constitutional powers for them. When adopted in 2004, 
the constitution of Mozambique clearly recognizes traditional leaders as legitimate in the eyes 
of the people and based on customary law (Art. 118). In Uganda, the constitutional resurgence 
in 2005 showcases an attempt to further define the role of cultural leaders which had already 
been recognised in 1995. 
6. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
In this article, we provide the first comparative, cross-country empirical evidence for the con-
stitutional resurgence of TPI since the 1990s in Sub-Sahara Africa. We show that constitutions 
today indeed include more regulations for TPI than in the year 1990. Compared to about 50 
percent in 1990, today almost 75 percent of states have constitutional status for TPI. 
Explaining the current constitutional integration of TPI, we find support for two of our con-
ditions: the combination of British colonial rule before independence and a high level of de-
concentration in settlement patterns is sufficient for a high level of constitutional integration. 
We find no consistent support for the three other conditions: democracy, state capacity, and 
economic development.  
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Regarding constitutional resurgence since 1990, we find only one causal factor. A deconcen-
tration of settlement patterns, i.e. reduced metropolization, is sufficient for the resurgence of 
TPI. Democratization, economic development, or foreign aid do not seem to have a consistent 
impact. As most Sub-Saharan states have democratized during our observation period, democ-
ratization comes close to a necessary condition, but is not sufficient to explain a constitutional 
resurgence of TPI.  
The roles of British colonial rule and deconcentrated settlement patterns can be similarly 
interpreted: Following British indirect rule traditional leaders may have been able to leverage 
their colonial status into constitutional integration. Low metropolization is equivalent to decon-
centrated settlement patterns. In such a setup there is more leverage for TPI to exert political 
influence as compared to metropolized, ethnically heterogeneous settlement patterns. In con-
clusion, British colonial rule and deconcentrated settlement patterns – or even an increase of 
the latter in recent times – may have enabled TPI to achieve constitutional integration. These 
results thus speak to findings by de Kadt and Larreguy (2018), Lange (2004) and others regard-
ing how colonial policies have shaped the social importance of TPI in contemporary politics. 
However, our findings also expand on this argument, showing that settlement patterns can fur-
ther determine how much leverage TPI can generate in order to increase their constitutional 
status. More generally, where the political geography of a country allows for sub-centres to 
emerge (instead of a single metropolitan centre), one may expect TPI with more constitutional 
powers, and possibly with greater effects on the various political issues and outcomes (devel-
opment, democracy, and conflict) shown by the growing literature on TPI. 
We see two avenues for further research. First, single or comparative case studies may further 
determine the causal relationships identified by the fsQCA. We have started to describe the 
causal mechanisms at play for a resurgence based on our theoretical framework and existing 
literature, but original and more targeted data collection could provide more specific observa-
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tions. Typical cases such as Botswana, Ghana, and South Africa for integration, and Mozam-
bique, Rwanda, or Uganda for resurgence can inform analyses about the relationship of changes 
in settlement patterns, a decline in metropolization and the constitutional resurgence of TPI.   
Second, our explanations may be expanded. The results for both outcomes are consistent and 
only very few cases that meet the causal conditions show neither constitutional integration nor 
resurgence. For both outcomes, however, we find a number of unexplained cases. Since other 
conditions we tested do not appear in consistent ways in the solution formulas, we conclude 
that the explanation is incomplete and there should be additional factors responsible for grant-
ing TPI constitutional status. Potential additional explanations for constitutional integration 
might include the ethnic composition of a country, or the internal organization of the ethnic 
groups (powerful kingdoms or weaker kinship groups). For these conditions, data was unavail-
able, and testing them would require further extensive original data collection. 
For constitutional resurgence, the distribution of political power might play a decisive role: 
powerful chiefs can lend electoral support or legitimacy to politicians and parties seeking 
power, and they can demand constitutional status in exchange. Weak governments may seek 
the support of TPI and offer legal recognition or even an institutional role in the state polity. 
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Table 1 Calibration of constitutional integration 
Value Outcome Attribution 
1.0 Integration TPI are part of the state and institutionalized but subordinated to the state 
0.7 Dualism TPI are recognized and accepted by the state; customary law exists next to state 
law; TPI are granted semi-autonomous rights in specific fields (e.g. dispute set-
tlement, cultural rituals, land rights) 
0.3 Tolerance TPI are not officially recognized but tolerated, e.g. indigenous languages are sup-
ported. State law is the only officially recognized law 




Table 2 Extent of constitutional integration, 1990 and current constitutions 
Value Outcome Number of countries Percentage 
  1990 current 1990 current 
1.0 Integration 12 15 26.6 33.3 
0.7 Dualism 3 13 6.7 28.9 
0.3 Tolerance 7 5 15.6 11.1 
0.0 Non-integration 23 12 51.1 26.7 




Table 3 Description of constitutional resurgence 
Value Outcome Number of countries Percentage 
1.0 Resurgence 16 35.6 
0.5 No change 23 51.1 
0.0 Dismantling 6 13.3 








Table 4  Parsimonious solution for integrationa 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.746024  
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
colonial*~metro 0.488083 0.488083 0.827099 
solution coverage:  0.488083 
solution consistency:  0.827099 




Table 5 Parsimonious solution for resurgence (model 1, three conditions)a 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.842648 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~metro 0.778849 0.385180 0.795044 
~demo 0.422783 0.029114 0.836097 
solution coverage:  0.807963 
solution consistency:  0.783290 




Table 6 Parsimonious solution for resurgence (model 2, four conditions)a 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.893158 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~metro*oda 0.656263 0.285522 0.890278 
~demo 0.422783 0.052042 0.836097 
solution coverage:  0.708305 
solution consistency:  0.834969 




Annex – QCA analyses, robustness checks; alternative approaches 
Analysis of integration 
Truth table 




capacity Metropolization Development 
Number 
of cases Integration 
Raw 
consistency PRI consistency Product Countries 
0 0 0 0 0 12   0.621354 0.431481 0.268102 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Eq. Guinea, Guinea, 
Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Rwanda 
1 1 0 0 0 6   0.920901 0.903637 0.832160 
Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Sierra Leone, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe 
1 0 0 0 0 5   0.868147 0.833855 0.723909 Ghana, Nigeria, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda 
0 1 0 0 0 4   0.587478 0.366313 0.215201 Comoros, DRC, Ethiopia, Mozambique 
0 1 0 1 0 4   0.479710 0.189848 0.091072 Burundi, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal 
1 1 1 0 1 4   0.746024 0.731199 0.545492 Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa 
0 0 0 1 0 2   0.559589 0.295709 0.165475 Mauretania, Togo 
1 0 0 1 0 2   0.680323 0.589642 0.401147 Eritrea, Gambia 
0 0 0 0 1 2   0.660537 0.48691 0.321622 Angola, Gabon 
1 0 0 0 1 1   1.000000 1.000000 1.000000 Swaziland 
0 0 0 1 1 1   0.509935 0.221262 0.112829 Congo 
0 0 1 0 0 0 log remain      
1 0 1 0 0 0 log remain      
0 0 1 1 0 0 log remain      
1 0 1 1 0 0 log remain      
1 0 0 1 1 0 log remain      
0 0 1 0 1 0 log remain      
1 0 1 0 1 0 log remain      
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0 0 1 1 1 0 log remain      
1 0 1 1 1 0 log remain      
1 1 0 1 0 0 log remain      
0 1 1 0 0 0 log remain      
1 1 1 0 0 0 log remain      
0 1 1 1 0 0 log remain      
1 1 1 1 0 0 log remain      
0 1 0 0 1 0 log remain      
1 1 0 0 1 0 log remain      
0 1 0 1 1 0 log remain      
1 1 0 1 1 0 log remain      
0 1 1 0 1 0 log remain      
0 1 1 1 1 0 log remain      




Necessary conditions, integration 
Table A2.1 Analysis of necessary conditions for integration and non-integration 
 Integration Non-integration 
Condition Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
Colonial rule 0.577406              0.766667 0.219895              0.233333 
~Colonial rule 0.422594              0.404000 0.780105 0.596000 
Democracy 0.633975              0.668684 0.616115              0.519333 
~Democracy 0.544283              0.639528 0.606941              0.569924 
State capacity 0.422071              0.725067 0.412042              0.565678 
~State capacity 0.747176              0.613924 0.799738              0.525140 
Metropolization 0.290098              0.539547 0.487767              0.724992 
~Metropolization 0.852136              0.675498 0.690212              0.437253 
Economic development 0.244521              0.671537 0.190260              0.417577 
~Economic development 0.787927              0.549062 0.850343              0.473549 
The “~“ represents the negation or the absence of the causal condition. 
 
Table A2.2 Compound analysis of necessary conditions for integration and non-
integration 
 Integration Non-integration 
Condition Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
~Metropolization + ~Colonial rule 0.910677             0.556601 . . 
~Metropolization + Colonial rule 0.941459 0.660896 . . 
~State Capacity + Colonial rule  0.949895 0.624896 . . 
State Capacity + ~Colonial rule . . 0.905628 0.536481 
~Economic development + Colonial rule 0.948611 0.576514   
~Economic development + ~Metropolization 0.960785 0.576969 . . 
Democracy + ~Economic development 0.918756 0.570006 . . 
~Democracy + ~Colonial rule . . 0.907785 0.539433 
~Economic development + State Capacity + 
~Colonial rule 
0.928714 0.541723 . . 
Economic development + ~State Capacity+ 
~Metropolization 
0.908014 0.603088 . . 
~Democracy + ~State Capacity + ~Metropolization 0.909099 0.604031 . . 
Economic development + Metropolization 
+~Colonial rule  
. . 0.925865 0.533438 
4 
 
~Democracy + ~Economic development + State 
Capacity 
0.932013 0.563371 . . 
~Democracy + Economic development + 
~Metropolization 
0.909417 0.636788 . . 
Democracy + ~State Capacity +  ~Colonial rule 0.911623 0.551064 . . 
Democracy + ~State Capacity +  ~Metropolization 0.921561 0.604233 . . 
Democracy + Economic Development +  
~Metropolization 
0.900377 0.632679 . . 
~Democracy + State Capacity + Metropolization + 
Colonial rule 
0.904239 0.646951 . . 
~Democracy + ~Economic Development + ~State 
Capacity + ~Colonial rule 
0.901548 0.544196 . . 
~Democracy + Economic Development + 
Metropolization + Colonial rule 
0.901455 0.641210 . . 
~Democracy + Economic Development + ~State 
Capacyity + ~Colonial rule 
0.905650 0.550880 . . 






Sufficient conditions, integration 
Table A3 Complex solution for integrationa 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.746024  
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
colonial*~metro*~statcap*~gdp         0.309659     0.129132     0.898760 
colonial*~metro*~statcap*~demo 0.205881     0.017708     0.883299 
colonial*~metro*statcap*gdp*demo 0.106311  0.080322    0.746024 
solution coverage:  0.416766 
solution consistency:  0.854310  
a no counterfactuals/ logical remainders are included 
 
Sufficient conditions, non-integration 
Table A4 Complex solution for non-integrationa 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.815086 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~colonial*metro*~statcap*~demo 0.299706 0.030992 0.825724 
~colonial*metro*~statcap*~gdp 0.350024 0.081310   0.831445 
solution coverage:  0.381016 
solution consistency:  0.838746 
a no counterfactuals / logical remainders included 
 
Table A5 Parsimonious solution for non-integrationa 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.815086 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~colonial*metro 0.395545 0.395545 0.843743 
solution coverage:  0.395545 
solution consistency:  0.843743 
a includes all logical remainders 
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Robustness-check: excluding the condition state capacity 
Sufficient conditions  
Table A6 Complex and parsimonious solution for integrationa 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.760103 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~metro*colonial 0.488083 0.488083 0.827099 
solution coverage:  0.488083 
solution consistency:  0.827099 
a in the complex solution no counterfactuals/ logical remainders included, the parsimonious solution contains all logical 
remainders; both solutions are identical 
 
 
Robustness-check: crisp-set analysis (csQCA) 
Necessary conditions 
Table A7 Analysis of necessary conditions for integration and non-integration 
 Integration Non-integration 
Condition Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
Colonial rule 0.576923 0.833333 0.176471 0.166667 
~Colonial rule 0.423077 0.440000 0.823529 0.560000 
Democracy 0.461538 0.666667 0.352941 0.333333 
~Democracy   0.538462 0.560000 0.647059 0.440000 
State capacity 0.115385 0.750000 0.058824 0.250000 
~State capacity 0.884615 0.589744 0.941176 0.410256 
Metropolization 0.076923              0.222222 0.411765 0.777778 
~Metropolization 0.923077 0.705882 0.588235 0.294118 
Economic development 0.192308 0.625000 0.176471 0.375000 
~Economic development 0.807692 0.600000 0.823529 0.400000 




Sufficient conditions, integration 
Table A8 Complex solution for integrationa 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.750000 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
metro*~statcap*~gdp*demo    0.346154 0.346154 0.900000 
colonial*~metro*~statcap*~demo 0.192308 0.192308 0.833333 
colonial*~metro*statcap*gdp*demo 0.115385 0.115385 0.750000 
solution coverage:  0.653846 
solution consistency:  0.850000 
a no counterfactuals / logical remainders included 
 
Table A9 Parsimonious solution for integrationa 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.746024  
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
colonial*~metro 0.538462 0.192308 0.875000 
demo*~metro 0.461538 0.115385 0.857143 
solution coverage:  0.653846 
solution consistency:  0.850000 







Additional statistical analyses, integration 
Correlations 










Integration 1.00      
Colonial rule 0.44* 1.00     
Democracy 0.08 0.22 1.00    
State capacity 0.23 0.35 0.29 1.00   
Metropolization -0.42* -0.30 -0.20 -0.25 1.00  
Economic 
development 0.08 0.22 0.23 0.60* -0.20 1.00 




Table A11 Ordered Logit Regression analysis of integration 
Variables Ordered Logit-Models 




















Colonial rule*Metropolization  0.024 
(0.05) 
Constant   
N 43 43 
R²/ Pseudo R² 0.1424 0.1445 
Log likelihood -48.967 -48.848 





Analysis of Resurgence 
Necessary conditions 
Table A12.1 Analysis of necessary conditions for resurgence and non-resurgence 
 Resurgence Non-resurgence 
Condition Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
Democratization 0.875139 0.665645 0.898975 0.560960 
~ Democratization 0.422783 0.836097 0.464174 0.753075 
Metropolization, increase 0.652673 0.776293 0.755261 0.736962 
~Metropolization, increase 0.778849 0.795044 0.770738 0.645451 
Economic development, 
increase 
0.757383 0.805621 0.808903 0.705879 
~Economic development, 
increase 
0.723490 0.821901 0.777251 0.724381 
The “~“ represents the negation or the absence of the causal condition. 
 
Table A12.2 Compound analysis of necessary conditions for resurgence and non-
resurgence 
 Resurgence Non-resurgence 
Condition Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
Democracy + Metropolization . . 0.926711 0.556319 
Democracy + ~ Metropolization 0.909556 0.647099 0.933041 0.544578 
Democracy + Economic Development 0.923193 0.6501225 0.947404 0.547339 
Democracy + ~ Economic Development   0.919370 0.6680986 0.943019 0.562197 






Analysis of resurgence 
Truth table. Model 1 
Table A13  Truth table for constitutional resurgence 
Democracy Metropolization Development 
Number 




consistency Product Countries 
1 0 1 11   0.865319 0.616085 0.53311 
Angola, Botswana, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, 
Lesotho, Mauritania, Mozambique, Rwanda, Uganda 
1 1 1 10   0.844734 0.6536277 0.453011 
Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Zambia  
1 1 0 9   0.821223 0.495480 0.406900 
Cameroon, Comoros, Djibouti, DRC, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sierra 
Leone, Togo 
1 0 0 9   0.869588 0.495480 0.406900 
Burundi, CAR, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Madagascar, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe 
0 0 1 1   0.904647 0.647814 0.586043 Gambia 
0 1 1 1   0.882317 0.603468 0.532450 Eritrea 
0 0 0 0 log remain      
0 1 0 0 log remain      
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Sufficient conditions, resurgence 
Table A14 Complex solution Resurgencea	frequency	cutoff:	1.000000		consistency	cutoff:	0.865319	 	raw	coverage		 	unique	coverage		 	consistency	~metro*demo	 0.744431	 0.403952	 0.837604	~demo*econ	 0.397540	 0.057061	 0.894785	solution	coverage:		 0.801493	solution	consistency:		 0.840036	a	 no	counterfactuals/	logical	remainders	are	included	
 
 
Sufficient conditions, non-resurgence 
Table A15 Complex solution non-resurgencea 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.805536 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~demo*econ 0.443275 0.074971 0.818520 
demo*metro 0.727524 0.359220 0.756572 
solution coverage:  0.802495 
solution consistency:  0.765121 
a no counterfactuals/ logical remainders included 
 
Table A16 Parsimonious solution non-resurgencea 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.805536 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
metro 0.755260 0.359894 0.736962 
~demo 0.464174 0.068808 0.753075 
solution coverage:  0.824068 
solution consistency:  0.725674 




Robustness-check: excluding cases without constitutional change (N=21) 
Table A17 Analysis of necessary conditions for resurgence and non-resurgence 
 Resurgence Non-resurgence 
Condition Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
Democratization 0.843770 0.695600 0.881878 0.487373 
~ Democratization 0.378178 0.826864 0.449203 0.658413 
Metropolization, increase 0.496954 0.673200 0.650781  0.590992 
~Metropolization, increase 0.698072 0.748860 0.640138 0.460354 
Economic development, 
increase 
0.604200 0.750046 0.644585 0.536421 
~Economic development, 
increase 
0.626564 0.724498 0.699645 0.542335 
The “~“ represents the negation or the absence of the causal condition. 
 
Table A18 Complex solution resurgencea 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.751379 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~metro*demo 0.686197 0.686197 0.771169 
solution coverage:  0.686197 
solution consistency:  0.771169 
a no counterfactuals / logical remainders included 
 
Table A19 Parsimonious solution resurgencea 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.842648 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~metro 0.698071 0.698071 0.748860 
solution coverage:  0.698071 
solution consistency:  0.748860 





Robustness-check: crisp-set analysis (csQCA) 
Table A20 Analysis of necessary conditions for resurgence and non-resurgence 
 Resurgence Non-resurgence 
Condition Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
Democratization 0.960784 0.620253 0.939394 0.392405 
~ Democratization 0.058824 0.600000 0.090909 0.600000 
Metropolization, increase 0.431373 0.550000 0.545455  0.450000 
~Metropolization, increase 0.568627 0.659091 0.454545 0.340909 
Economic development, 
increase 
0.588235 0.625000 0.545455 0.375000 
~Economic development, 
increase 
0.411765 0.583333 .454545 0.416667 
The “~“ represents the negation or the absence of the causal condition. 
 
Table A21 Complex and parsimonious solution resurgencea 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.695652 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~metro*demo*econ 0.313726 0.313726 0.695652 
solution coverage:  0.313726 
solution consistency:  0.695652 
a no counterfactuals / logical remainders included in the  complex solution, the parsimonious solution contains all logical          
remainders; both solutions are identical 
 
 
Robustness-check: excluding the condition democratization  
Table A22 Model 1: Complex and parsimonious solution resurgencea 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.859328 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~metro 0.778849 0.778849 0.795044 
solution coverage:  0.778849 
solution consistency:  0.795044 
a no counterfactuals / logical remainders included in the  complex solution, the parsimonious solution contains all logical          





Analysis of resurgence 
Correlations 
Table A23 Correlation matrix 
 Resurgence Democracy Metropolization Development 
Resurgence 1.00    
Democratization 0.08 1.00   
Metropolization -0.15 0.07 1.00  
Development -0.09 -0.24 0.06 1.00 
* p < .1 
 
Regressions 
Table A24 Regression analysis of resurgence, OLS 
 OLS-Models 
Variables 
Full Model Without 
Democratization 
Reduced Sample 
Democratization 0.004  
(0.009) 
  0.04  
(0.03) 










 0.001  
(0.001) 




 0.009  
(0.02) 
N 42 42 21 
R² 0.0346 0.0294 0.0962 





Additional robustness checks 
Robustness-check: urbanization instead of metropolization, outcome integration 
Necessary conditions 
Table A25 Analysis of necessary conditions for integration and non-integration 
 Integration Non-integration 
Condition Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
Metropolization 0.290098              0.539547 0.487767              0.724992 
~Metropolization 0.852136              0.675498 0.690212              0.437253 
Urbanization 0.249420 0.579933 0.320074 0.594747 
~Urbanization 0.825707 0.603111 0.773933 0.451763 
The “~“ represents the negation or the absence of the causal condition. 
 
Sufficient conditions, integration 
Table A26 Complex solution for integrationa 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.706399 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
colonial*~gdp*~statcap*~urban    0.316521 0.285413 0.819385 
~urban*~statcap*~demo*gdp 0.112151   0.073396 0.823053 
colonial*statcap*gdp*demo 0.106311 0.080322 0.746024 
solution coverage:  0.479316 
solution consistency:  0.786551 
a no counterfactuals / logical remainders included 
 
Table A27 Parsimonious solution for integrationa 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.706399 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
colonial 0.577406 0.476568 0.766667 
gdp*~urban 0.164232 0.063395 0.743981 
solution coverage:  0.640801 
solution consistency:  0.758553 




Robustness-check: urbanization instead of metropolization, outcome resurgence 
Necessary conditions 
Table A28 Analysis of necessary conditions for resurgence and non-resurgence 
 Resurgence Non-resurgence 
Condition Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
Metropolization 0.652673 0.776293 0.755261 0.736962 
~Metropolization 0.778849 0.795044 0.770738 0.645451 
Urbanization 0.867305 0.680064 0.837187 0.538541 
~Urbanization 0.411488 0.754944 0.502644 0.756549 
The “~“ represents the negation or the absence of the causal condition. 
 
Sufficient conditions 
Table A29 Complex solution for resurgence 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.855231 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
demo*gpd*~urban    0.396031 0.191288 0.855231 
~demo*gdp*urban 0.354601 0.149858 0.883528 
solution coverage:  0.545889 
solution consistency:  0.862490 
a no counterfactuals / logical remainders included 
 
Table A30 Parsimonious solution for resurgence 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.855231 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~demo 0.422783 0.160539 0.836097 
~urban 0.411488 0.149244 0.754944 
solution coverage:  0.572027 
solution consistency:  0.750962 




Robustness-check: including conflict, outcome resurgence 
Necessary conditions 
Table A31 Analysis of necessary conditions for resurgence and non-resurgence 
 Resurgence Non-resurgence 
Condition Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
Conflict 0.736139 0.871754 0.853109 0.828813 
~Conflict 0.855444  0.876523 0.867994 0.729637 
The “~“ represents the negation or the absence of the causal condition. 
 
Sufficient conditions 
Table A32 Complex solution for resurgence 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.872791 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
demo*~metro    0.744431 0.744431 0.837604 
solution coverage:  0.744431 
solution consistency:  0.837604 
a no counterfactuals / logical remainders included 
 
Table A33 Parsimonious solution for resurgence 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.872791 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~metro 0.778849 0.778849 0.795044 
solution coverage:  0.778849 
solution consistency:  0.795044 





Truthtable. Model 2(including ODA as forth condition) 
 Table A34  Truth table for constitutional resurgence 








consistency Product Countries 
1 0 1 0 9 
 
0.844118 0.538038 0.552617 Angola, Botswana, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea, 
Lesotho, Mauritania, Mozambique 
1 1 1 1 6 
 
0.873422 0.571921 0.585948 Burkina Faso, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland 
1 1 0 0 6 
 
0.805882 0.460525 0.462167 Comoros, Djibouti, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo 
1 0 0 1 6 
 
0.893158 0.673999 0.693514 Burundi, Cote d’Ivorire, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Zimbabwe 
1 1 1 0 4 
 
0.839229 0.521372 0.521963 Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Sudan, Zambia 
1 1 0 1 3 
 
0.85767 0.539057 0.556369 Cameroon, Democratic Republic Congo, Sierra Leone 
1 0 0 0 3 
 
0.856527 0.555212 0.559332  Congo, Madagascar, Tanzania 
1 0 1 1 2  0.906426 0.692499 0.692499 Rwanda, Uganda 
0 1 1 1 1  0.914866 0.671392 0.694571 Eritrea 
0 0 1 0 1  0.897596 0.626614 0.628911 Gambia 
0 1 1 0 0 log remain     
0 1 0 1 0 log remain     
0 1 0 0 0 log remain     
0 0 1 1 0 log remain     
0 0 0 1 0 log remain     






Necessary conditions. Model 2 
Table A35 Analysis of necessary conditions for resurgence and non-resurgence 
 Resurgence Non-resurgence 
Condition Consistency Coverage Consistency Coverage 
ODA 0.750115 0.806032 0.739915 0.652266 
~ODA 0.676390  0.760193 0.779968 0.719155 
The “~“ represents the negation or the absence of the causal condition. 
 
Sufficient conditions. Model 2 
Table A36 Complex solution for resurgence 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.872791 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
demo*~metro *oda   0.634385 0.314402 0.891454 
~demo*~metro*gdp*~oda 0.340384 0.033694 0.897596 
~demo*metro*gdp*oda 0.340412 0.035390 0.914866 
solution coverage:  0.703469 
solution consistency:  0.875295 







Table A37 Parsimonious solution for resurgence 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.893158 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~metro*oda 0.656263 0.285522 0.890278 
~demo 0.422783 0.052042 0.836097 
solution coverage:  0.708305 
solution consistency:  0.834969 
a all counterfactuals/ logical remainders included 
 
 
Robustness-check: excluding the condition democratization  
 
Table A37 Model 2: Complex and parsimonious solution resurgencea 
frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
consistency cutoff: 0.896053 
 
raw coverage  
 
unique coverage  
 
consistency 
~metro*oda 0.656263 0.656263 0.890278 
solution coverage:  0.656263 
solution consistency:  0.890278 
a no counterfactuals / logical remainders included in the  complex solution, the parsimonious solution contains all logical          
remainders; both solutions are identical 
 
